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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 981669
Priority No. 2

HOWARD LLOYD MILES,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows:
Whether Officer Collins acted in bad faith in disposing of
blood samples after being informed that other evidentiary samples
from the scene of the crime could not be collected and after
being directed by the lab technician to provide the samples to
the State Crime Lab for testing, among other things.
Standard of Review:
[T] he determination of whether specific police conduct rises
to the level of bad faith is a question of law, reviewed
under a correctness standard. See State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 936-37 (Utah 1994) . However, because the determination
of bad faith turns on " v the quintessential factual question
of intent,'» [U. S. v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 909 (10th Cir.
1994)] (citation omitted); [U.S. v. McKie, 951 P.2d 399, 403
(D.C. Cir. 1991)], the bad-faith legal standard "is one that
conveys a measure of discretion to the trial judge when
applying that standard to a given set of facts." Pena, 869
P.2d at 93 9. As in Pena, a case involving a constitutional
question dependent on application of a legal standard to a
given set of facts, it is impossible for us to precisely
define the scope of that discretion other than to say that
"we would not anticipate a close, de novo review. On the
other hand, a sufficiently careful review is necessary to

assure that the purposes of the [bad-faith] requirement are
served." Id. Accordingly we apply an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review.
State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 324 (Utah App. 1998); see also
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald,

961 P.2d 305, 315-16 (Utah 1998).

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The issue on appeal was preserved in the record ("R.") at
100; 102-110; 151:301-02, 315; 152.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provisions will be
determinative of the issue on appeal:
Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
The text of those provisions is contained in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
On December 18, 1997, the state charged Howard Lloyd Miles
("Miles") with burglary, a third degree felony offense in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), and criminal mischief,
a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106
(Supp. 1997).

(R. 2-4.)

After the first day of trial in this

matter, Miles made a motion to dismiss the charges based on the
state's destruction of evidence.

(R. 102-110.)

The trial court

denied the motion, as set forth in the Memorandum Decision
attached hereto as Addendum B, and the state-prepared Findings
and Conclusions attached hereto as Addendum C.
2

(See R. 116-130.)

The jury found Miles guilty of both offenses as charged (R.
52; 90-91), and Miles was sentenced to serve three months in jail
followed by probation. (R. 112-15.)

A copy of the judgment and

sentencing order is attached hereto as Addendum D.

Miles hereby

appeals from the final judgment; he is challenging the trial
court's ruling on the motion to dismiss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Miles was charged with burglary, a third degree felony
offense, and criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor for
allegedly breaking into an Einstein Bagels restaurant in December
1997.

(R. 2-4.) During the trial, the state designated Officer

Scott Collins as the state's representative (R. 150:105), and
presented the following evidence.
Restaurant manager Eric Heaston testified that he was
notified of a break-in at the restaurant at 4:00 a.m. on December
10, 1997.

When he arrived at the restaurant he observed that the

double-pane glass in the drive-through window was shattered, and
there was "blood all over the place from -- probably from the
[broken] glass." (R. 150:121, 123, 124, 129.)

According to

Heaston, there was a particularly bloody area inside the
restaurant (R. 150:131), and there were bloody handprints inside
a closet that was accessible only from the outside of the
building.

(R. 150:133-34.)

Nothing was taken from the bagel shop.

(R. 150:125.)

Restaurant employees began cleaning the blood smears at 6:00 a.m.
on the morning of the incident. (R. 150:141.)
3

Steven Winberg was across the street from the restaurant, in
the bed of his truck, loading a Salter on the morning of December
10th.

(R. 150:144-45.)

He testified that he observed a person

in a knit ski cap walking in the area, and at one point, as the
person walked by his truck, he had his head down and they "kind
of looked at each other [at] the same time," and they exchanged
words. (R. 150:146-47, 161, 164, 177.)

Thereafter, the person

crossed the highway to a dark parking lot, and Winberg either got
into his truck (R. 150:150) or started walking to follow the
person.

(R. 150:151.)

From a distance "across the highway" (R.

150:151), Winberg observed the person punch out the glass in the
drive-through window of the restaurant, and crawl into the
building through the window. (R. 150:149-153.) Winberg tried
several times to contact police and "finally got a hold of them
and told them what was going on and they just told [him] to hang
tight." (R. 150:153, 186.)
Winberg admitted that "because of the darkness and not good
light," all he could see at that point "was a figure."

"I

couldn't see anything besides that. All I seen was somebody was
there."

(R. 150:154; see also 150:169.)

According to Winberg,

there were no street lights in the area of the bagel shop, and he
could not recall what the lighting was like in the restaurant
parking lot. (R. 150:184.)

Winberg testified that as he observed

the incident from across the street, he also was attempting to
get the attention of another worker "to come down and pick [him]
up." (R. 150:154.)
4

Winberg observed the person in the cap exit the building
through a back door (R. 150:155-56), and walk south.

Thereafter,

Miles was arrested. (R. 150:157-58.)
Winberg testified that he "never lost sight [of the person
in the cap] the whole time."

(R. 150:158.)

He also testified

that during the entire incident he was on the telephone, he was
looking for the other worker to pick him up, and he walked around
the truck to climb into it. (R. 150:165-68.)
Winberg identified Miles as the person in the cap. (R.
150:159-162.)

Miles was not wearing a cap. (R. 150:161-62, 167,

192-93, 200-01.)

Winberg's testimony required the jury to

resolve whether Winberg clearly identified Miles as the person
who broke into the restaurant. (See. R. 82-84 (eyewitness
instruction); 151:316.)
The state's next witness, Starla Roque, was delivering
papers at the restaurant on December 10th.

She testified that

while she sat in her car she observed a man exit the building at
4:00 in the morning, and then he disappeared around the side of
the building. She stated that she later saw Miles in police
custody. (R. 150:216.)

Roque testified that she observed the

man, who exited the restaurant, five feet from her car. She
identified the man as Miles. (R. 150:217, 227.)
On cross-examination, Roque admitted that prior to trial she
did not recall what the man looked like; she did not recall
whether he was wearing a cap, whether he had facial hair, or
whether his hair was straight or curly, but remembered only that
5

he had blond hair and dark clothes.

(R. 150:221.)

Roque also

admitted that before she testified, the prosecutor sought to
enhance her identification of Miles with a picture of him.

(R.

Roquefs testimony required the jury to resolve

150:223-24.)

whether Roque clearly identified the person who was leaving the
restaurant as Miles. (See R. 82-84 (eyewitness instruction); see
also 151:316.)
Deputy Allen Morrical testified that he stopped Miles while
Miles was walking down the street a short distance from the bagel
restaurant, and arrested him.

(R. 150:232.)

Morrical testified

that he observed several small cuts on Miles' hands. (R. 150:23435.)

Morrical did not find a cap at the arrest scene or at the

restaurant.

(R. 150:239-40; see also 150:135.)

Officer Collins testified that he responded to the call from
dispatch and collected witness statements.

(R. 150:244-46.)

He

observed small, fresh abrasions on Miles' knuckles (R. 150:24647), and significant areas of blood in the restaurant. (R.
150:250-51.)

He also testified that Miles' hands were not

bleeding, and did not require medical attention. (R. 150:247-48.)
Collins testified that he made an attempt to collect blood
samples, but was unable to successfully gather a sample that
would be of any evidentiary value. (R. 150:253-54, 262-63.)
Thus, he had photographs taken of areas where fresh blood was
smeared or dropped. (R. 150:254.)

Collins also testified that he

requested an evidence technician to lift fingerprints from the
scene, but was told at the time that the technician could not

6

successfully lift latent prints.

(R. 150:255.)

Collins

requested that an officer take photographs of a footprint, but
made no attempt to compare it to Miles' footprint.

(R. 150:256.)

On the second day of trial, evidence technician John Bell
testified outside the presence of the jury that he collected
blood samples from the scene on two swatches, properly preserved
the swatches, and "turned everything over to Deputy Collins."
(R. 151:292-93, 296; see also 151:324-25.)

Bell informed Collins

that he did not know if the samples would be sufficient for
testing and Collins would "have to turn it over to the State
Crime Lab, because we don't do that kind of work."

(R. 151:2 93.)

Bell also testified that he "left that decision up to
Detective Collins as to whether or not [the samples] would be
submitted to the Crime Lab."

(R. 151:294; see also 151:327.)

Bell did not know if the samples still existed since he left them
in Collins' care. (R. 151:295.)

Also, he could not say if a

sample of the size he collected at the restaurant could be tested
by the Crime Lab. (R. 151:295.)

Since Collins was not in

attendance at the trial on the second day, the prosecutor
represented that apparently Collins "decided that he wasn't going
to submit [the samples].

I mean, that's a decision he has to

live with as far as his investigation goes."

(R. 151:307.)

During the defense's case, Miles' mother testified that
Miles is right-handed, and that when he was released from jail
she observed he had only a small cut on his left hand on his
pinky finger. (R. 151:334-35.)
7

Inasmuch as counsel for the defense was unaware until after
Collins testified on the first day of trial that blood samples
were taken from the scene, counsel made a motion in open court to
continue the matter (R. 151:287-88, 302), and subsequently moved
to dismiss the case based on the state's wrongful destruction of
the blood samples. (R. 100-110.)

After the trial, the court

denied the motion in a memorandum decision, wherein the court
stated that there was no evidence of bad faith on Collins' part
in destroying the samples. (R. 124.)

Miles asserts on appeal

that the trial court erred in its ruling.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
government violates a criminal defendant's due process rights
when it destroys evidence that is potentially useful.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).

Arizona v.

To establish a violation

under Youngblood, defendant must show that the government acted
in bad faith.

In this case, Collins destroyed blood samples that

Bell collected from the scene of the crime.

The samples were

destroyed before tests could be conducted on them.

Miles

maintains that the samples would have exonerated him of the
charged offenses.

Thus, he made a motion in the trial court to

continue the trial or dismiss the charges on the grounds that
Collins destroyed the samples in bad faith.
The trial court denied Miles' motion and found that Collins
and Bell apparently had a miscommunication with respect to
whether the samples could be tested.
8

According to the trial

court, Collins did not act in bad faith.
The trial court's findings are incorrect. The record
reflects that Collins misrepresented facts at trial concerning
collection of the blood samples, the state improperly withheld
evidence from the defense concerning the samples, Collins destroyed the samples before testing and apparently in violation of
normal practices, and Collins reasonably knew of the evidentiary
value of the samples at the time that he destroyed them. Collins
acted in bad faith. The constitutional violation prejudiced
Miles, requiring reversal of this matter for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THAT COLLINS ACTED IN BAD FAITH WHEN HE
DESTROYED THE BLOOD SAMPLES.
A. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE PROHIBITS THE PROSECUTION TEAM
FROM DESTROYING CERTAIN EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO THE CASE.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution requires the prosecution team to disclose
all evidence to the criminal defendant that is material either to
guilt or punishment.1
(1984) .

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481

In addition, that clause prohibits the state and

officers investigating the case from destroying certain evidence
prior to trial.
The principles articulated by the United States Supreme
1 Miles asserts that Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution requires the same disclosure. See also State v.
Thomas, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1999) (recognizing that
prosecution's open file policy requires complete disclosure of
inculpatory and exculpatory information). Miles is not seeking a
separate analysis under the state constitution.
9

Court in Trombetta and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988),
concern the wrongful destruction of evidence.

In Trombetta, the

Court considered whether the prosecution was constitutionally
required to preserve breath samples used to obtain intoxication
test results that were provided to the defense during pre-trial
discovery. The test results supported defendants' convictions.
According to the Court, the constitutional duty to preserve
evidence "must be limited to evidence that might be expected to
play a significant role in the suspect's defense."
467 U.S. at 488.

Trombetta,

"To meet this standard of constitutional

materiality, [] evidence must both possess an exculpatory value
that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of
such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means."
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489 (cites omitted).
In Trombetta, the Court determined that the state did not
violate defendants' due process rights by destroying the breath
samples.

The Court ruled that (1) in light of the procedures

used to obtain the test results, it was unlikely that preserved
samples would have exculpated the defendants; (2) defendants were
"perfectly capable of raising" issues concerning the validity of
the testing process without the actual breath samples; and (3)
the officers acted in good faith in destroying the samples, since
destruction was in accordance with their normal practice. Id. at
488-90; see also State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 516-17 (Utah App.
1998) (recognizing Trombetta ruling); State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d
10

101, 106 (Utah 1985) (defendant must show that evidence destroyed
by prosecution was material to guilt or innocence for destruction
to constitute a due process violation); State v. Stewart, 544
P.2d 477, 479 (Utah 1975).
Under the two-prong Trombetta test, the government violates
a defendant's right to due process when: (1) it destroys
evidence whose exculpatory significance is "apparent before"
destruction; and (2) the defendant remains unable to "obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means."
U.S. v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 909-10 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489).
In Youngblood, the Supreme Court extended the Trombetta
analysis. The Court determined that if destroyed evidence was
"potentially useful" -- that is, its exculpatory value had not
yet been determined -- the defendant must show that the
government acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence to
establish a due process violation. See Bohl, 25 F.3d at 910.
In Youngblood, the victim of a sexual assault was taken to
the hospital where a physician used a "sexual assault kit" to
collect evidence of the assault, including saliva, blood and hair
samples.

The physician did not examine the samples, but placed

them in a secure refrigerator. Later, another officer examined
the samples, determined an assault had occurred and placed the
samples back in the refrigerator. Youngblood 488 U.S. at 52-54.
Two months after the assault, the state tried to collect semen
samples from the victim's clothing, but was unsuccessful.

Id.

During pre-trial discovery, "[t]he State disclosed relevant
police reports to [defendant], which contained information about
11

the existence of the swab and the clothing, and the boy's
examination at the hospital.

The State provided

[defendant's]

expert with the laboratory reports and notes prepared by the
police criminologist, and [defendant's] expert had access to the
swab and to the clothing."

Id. at 55.

Notwithstanding the

information made available to defendant, he maintained that the
state violated his due process rights by failing to make timely
efforts to collect "semen samples from the victim's body and
clothing."

Id. at 52.

In considering the matter, the Supreme Court determined that
the evidence supported that the officers' failure to refrigerate
the clothing and to perform earlier tests on the semen samples
constituted negligence.

Further, " [n]one of this information was

concealed from [defendant] at trial, and the evidence -- such as
it was -- was made available to [defendant's] expert who declined
to perform any tests on the samples."

Id. at 58.

The Court recognized that the unpreserved semen samples may
have exonerated defendant.

Id. at 56.

However, because "no more

can be said [of the evidence other] than that it could have been
subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated
the defendant," id. at 57, the Court ruled that defendant must
show that the police acted in "bad faith" in failing to preserve
the potentially useful evidence.

Id. at 58.

Because the

officers in Younablood made full disclosure with respect to the
evidence in their possession, and they provided the defendant
with the opportunity to assess that information, defendant was
12

unable to show bad faith on the part of the officers for failing
to preserve the samples.

Id.

After Youngblood, this Court considered the issue of police
misconduct in destroying potentially useful evidence in State v.
Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 323 (Utah App. 1998).

In that case, this

Court identified the defendant's burden as follows:
Regarding cases when the state has failed "to preserve
evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that
it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which
might have exonerated the defendant," [Youngblood, 488 U.S.
at 57] , a defendant must show "bad faith on the part of the
police," [id. at 58]. Bad faith requires that a defendant
prove more than mere negligence; a defendant must show that
"the police ... by their conduct indicate that the evidence
could form a basis for exonerating the defendant." Id.
Holden, 964 P.2d at 323.
In Miles' case, the samples apparently were destroyed before
their usefulness could be determined.

Thus, the analysis set

forth in Youngblood and Holden applies, as set forth below.
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS REGARDING BAD FAITH ARE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND THEY DISREGARD IMPORTANT EVIDENCE
CONCERNING COLLINS' CONDUCT.
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in
this matter, the relevant finding concerning whether Collins'
acted in good/bad faith in destroying the evidence reflected the
following: "There was an apparent miscommunication between the
officers as to the sufficiency of the blood samples." (R. 128;
see also.) 2

That finding is clearly erroneous.

In addition, the

2 The "findings" portion of the order contained four "findings of
fact." The first and fourth findings do not relate to Collins'
conduct. The first finding states, "The destroyed blood samples,
at best, have only a mere possibility of being exculpatory in
(continued...)
13

trial court disregarded evidence of bad faith, including the
following: The record supports that (1) the state improperly
withheld information during pre-trial discovery that officers
collected blood samples from the crime scene; (2) Collins
misrepresented facts about the blood samples when he testified,
thereby avoiding cross-examination on the matter; (3) Collins
destroyed the samples apparently in violation of normal
practices; and (4) Collins' knew that the samples could be
exculpatory at the time he destroyed them.

Under Youngblood, the

facts reflect bad faith.
Specifically, on the second day of trial, defense counsel
discovered that the state withheld police reports during pretrial discovery that would have disclosed that officers collected
blood samples from the crime scene. (R. 151:287-88, 302-304, 310
(court recognized that if the state had disclosed reports to
defense counsel during pre-trial discovery, "she would have known
when Deputy Collins was testifying that there was apparently a

(...continued)
nature."
(R. 128.) The fourth finding recognizes that the blood
samples had not yet been tested. Both findings 1 and 4 support
application of the Youngblood analysis to this case.
The second "finding" may be more appropriately characterized
as a conclusion. It states: "There exists no evidence of bad
faith on the part of Officer Collins." (Id.) "Bad faith" is the
conclusion to the mixed question of law and fact; the conclusion
must be based in the facts. See State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188,
191 (Utah 1986) (court "conclude[s]" as a "matter of law" that
conduct constituted "bad faith"); see also Trulis v. Barton, 107
F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that uncontroverted
facts demonstrate "bad faith as a matter of law"). The conclusory
determination of "bad faith" set forth in the findings is similar
to "conclusions" 2 and 6, which concern "bad faith." (R. 12 9.)
14

sample taken").) 3

The defense alerted the trial judge to the

matter, and the prosecutor responded that he "thought" he had
disclosed the reports although he could not confirm that fact.
(R. 151:289; see note 3, herein supra.) The state's failure to
disclose the report supports bad faith.
In addition, Collins specifically left the impression from
his trial testimony that no blood

samples

were

collected,

thereby

effectively preventing the defense from examining him with

3 On February 12, 1998, counsel for Miles requested discovery of
"all physical evidence taken and all investigative analy[ses]
done on any evidence in the above-entitled case." (R. 9-10.)
Counsel also requested evidence relating to Miles' hands. (R.
12.) On the second day of trial, counsel for the defense
discovered that the state failed to disclose reports reflecting
the fact that Bell collected blood samples at the crime scene.
Counsel raised this issue to the trial court. (R. 151:287-88;
152:4.) In response, the prosecutor, Ernie Jones, stated that he
"thought" his office had provided the reports along with other
papers to the defense, and even if he had not provided the
reports, "what's the prejudice here?" (R. 151:289.) The judge
declined to rule on whether the prosecutor failed in his duty to
disclose the reports to the defense during pre-trial discovery.
(See R. 151:290.)
In State v. Thomas, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6 (Utah 1999), the
Utah Supreme Court reiterated the importance of the prosecution's
duty to provide full disclosure in discovery. In that case, the
state similarly believed it had provided a particular document to
the defense in response to discovery requests, although no record
of the disclosure existed in the file. The Utah Supreme Court
declined to find that the disclosure had been made, absent
something in the record supporting the state's position: "Despite
the State's beliefs and its insistence to the contrary, we have
no documentary evidence before us that indicates [defendant's]
counsel - either past or present - ever received the [document].
We therefore find that the State acted improperly in not
furnishing a copy of [the document] to [defendant's] subsequent
counsel." Thomas, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6.
In this matter, there is no documentary evidence that the
state disclosed the reports to the defense prior to trial. In
accordance with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Thomas, "the
State acted improperly in not furnishing a copy of [the document]
to [defendant's] subsequent counsel." Id.
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respect to his unilateral decision to destroy the samples after
he had been directed to submit them to the crime lab for testing.
Collins1 testimony was as follows:
[Prosecutor]: Let me ask you: Did you try to collect any of
this blood, any of the physical evidence there at the scene?
[Collins]: We did.
[Prosecutor]: And were you able to do that at all?
[Collins]: Not successfully where we felt it would have any
evidentiary value. It was so cold outside and we took - I
had called out an evidence tech to the scene for
photographs, possible processing of any latent and any
collection of any other evidence he deemed necessary.
He had taken a napkin and wiped it along the ice - the
blood-stained ice on the sill - and nothing came off.
We went to the wall, tried to collect some of that;
nothing came off. I - we - we pondered whether maybe we
could scrape something off the wall and be able to get
anything like that, and it was a consensus amongst all of us
that were there that it probably wouldn't be worth any
evidentiary value at that time.
[Prosecutor]: So you're saying you attempted to try to
collect some of this blood but [Collins]: Uh-huh.
photographed it.

(Affirmative.) That's why we

[Prosecutor]: Let me ask you: Did the blood that you saw
inside of Einsteins, did that appear to be fresh?
[Collins]: It did. It appeared to be fresh insofar as there
was no dust on it, there was no snow on it, it didn't appear
to be iced over or any foreign particle or matter on top of
it.
(R. 150:254-55.)

Collins also testified as follows:

[Defense Counsel]: [I]t was your collective opinion that you
couldn't take any blood samples from this scene?
[Collins]: That's correct.
[Defense Counsel]: So you weren't able to determine what
blood type the blood was.
[Collins]: Well, understand, it was not my attempt,
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necessarily, to try to collect blood. That's what our
evidence technician was for. It was his opinion that he
articulated to me that he felt he couldn't successfully take
a blood sample that the State Lab would be able to do
anything with.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. So, based on that opinion, there
were no blood samples taken?
[Collins]: There were no blood samples booked into evidence,
that's correct.
[Defense Counsel]: All right. So there's no way of knowing
what blood type that blood was?
[Collins]: Obviously, if we don't have it, we can't match
it.
[Defense Counsel]: And if you had it, I guess, you could
have at least checked the blood type, right?
[Collins]: If the district attorney ordered so and the State
Lab was able to do it, then I suppose, yes, maybe that would
be true.
(R. 150:263-64.)

Collins' testimony supports that no samples

were taken.
According to the record, he avoided the question as to
whether samples were collected, by responding that no samples
were "booked into evidence," and by representing that blood
samples could not be taken from the scene.

As an experienced law

officer, Collins knew that his answers were misleading.

In

response to an additional question concerning whether there was
any way of knowing the blood type without samples, Collins went
one step further by affirmatively representing the "obvious" -that without samples there is no way to match the blood type.
The appropriate responses to the questions would have revealed
that the samples were collected and that he destroyed them.
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Collins never disclosed that information.

Instead, he

provided

misleading testimony.
"It is

well

settled

that deliberate deception of a court and

jurors by the presentation of known false evidence cannot be
reconciled with the rudimentary demands of justice."

Campbell v.

Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Pvle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213 (1942)) (emphasis added).

"The same result obtains when

the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to
go uncorrected when it appears."

Id. (quoting Napue v. Illinois,

360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)); see also Walker v. State, 624 P.2d
687, 690 (Utah 1981) (allowing false impressions to go forward
involves a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial
process).

Here, "the prosecution allowed a false impression to

be created at trial."

Campbell, 594 F.2d at 8.

In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that a law enforcement officer must be aware
of the need for accuracy in making representations for the
purpose of obtaining a warrant.

An officer must also be aware of

"the importance of absolute truthfulness in any statements made
under oath."

Id.

In that case, an officer left false

impressions when he made incorrect statements to a magistrate in
support of obtaining a search warrant.

The Utah Supreme Court

ruled that where an officer provides knowingly false information
under oath, "as a matter of law, he acted in bad faith." Id.
In Younablood, the Supreme Court found no "bad faith" in the
fact that the state made full disclosure with respect to relevant
18

police reports and collected samples, and made samples available
to the defendant and his experts for testing.

"None of this

information was concealed from [defendant] at trial."
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.

In Miles' case, Collins1

misrepresentations and the state's failure to disclose reports
relating to blood samples reflects bad faith.
Further, the marshaled evidence, which includes Bell's
testimony and Collins' testimony taken together, does not support
"an apparent miscommunication," as set forth in the findings.
(See R. 128; note 2, herein supra.) Rather, the fact that Collins
misrepresented the matter at trial supports the determination
that he understood Bell's directions, but made the unilateral
decision to destroy the samples, then tried to hide that fact.
That is all that can be said about the conflict in testimony.
Collins' carefully structured answers to questions at trial left
a knowingly false impression that no blood samples were
collected.

They do not reflect a "miscommunication."

Next, the evidence supports that Collins destroyed the
samples apparently in violation of normal practices.

Bell

testified that he directed Collins "to turn [the samples] over to
the State Crime Lab" for testing, and that there may be enough
for testing. (R. 151:293.)

Specifically, Bell testified as

follows:
[Counsel for Defense]: So you did not tell Deputy Collins
that there was no way that the State Crime Lab could test
these samples; is that correct?
[Bell]: I did not, no.
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[Counsel for Defense]: Because that would be a call that the
State Crime Lab would have to make; isn't that right?
[Bell]: Yes.
[Counsel for Defense] : And as far as you knew, there was a
possibility that they could test that blood; isn't that
right?
[Bell]: There was a possibility.
[Counsel for Defense]: And a decision as to whether or not
to send that sample to the State Crime Lab was with Deputy
Collins; isn't that correct?
[Bell]: Yes.
[Counsel for Defense]: It was not your decision.
[Bell]: No, it was not.
(R. 151:327-29.)

The trial judge summarized the matter as

follows:
I don't know what to believe about Deputy Collins now. He's
told us one thing and apparently this witness has a
different recollection, that a sample was taken and the
sample wasn't submitted. Now, is that something we're going
to allow police officers to make the decision?
If a competent technician collects a sample and says,
"I don't know if this is going to be enough for the state
lab to do it, but here it is," and the officer decides,
"Well, I'm not going to do it," for whatever reason, I don't
think that's a police officer's decision.
(R. 151:307-08.) The prosecutor agreed: "Well, it may not be. And
I think the defense can argue that to the jury."

(R. 151:308.)

In addition, Collins' testimony supports that his unilateral
decision to destroy samples apparently was contrary to department practices.

Collins stated the following earlier at trial:

[Defense Counsel]: And if you had [collected samples], I
guess, you could have at least checked the blood type,
right?
[Collins]: If the district attorney ordered so and the State
Lab was able to do it, then I suppose, yes, maybe that would
20

be true.
(R. 150:263-64.)
In Youngblood, the Court found that destroying evidence in
accordance with normal practices supported a showing of good
faith.

In Miles' case, Collins' unilateral decision to destroy

the samples was contrary to Bell's instructions, and to Collins'
understanding as to how samples would be handled, where he
testified that if he had samples, he would await the district
attorney's orders and a determination from the State Lab as to
whether testing could be accomplished.

The record supports bad

faith conduct on Collins' part in destroying the samples.
Finally, with respect to the trial court's determination
that "Collins did not have knowledge of the exculpatory value of
the blood samples at the time he discarded them" (R. 12 9; see
also 124), that is not supported by facts based in the record.
Indeed, it is impossible to know from the record when Collins
destroyed the samples since he never disclosed that fact.

In the

event he destroyed them after the defense served the discovery
requests on the state, see note 3, supra, Collins was on notice
that the samples could have exculpatory value for the defense.
If Collins destroyed the samples at that time he acted in bad
faith.

See Bohl, 25 F.3d at 911 (destruction of evidence was in

bad faith where government destroyed evidence after it was
specifically placed on notice that defense requested inspection
of the information).
In addition, at the time the blood samples were collected,
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Collins was on notice that Bell was unable to collect any other
evidentiary samples from the crime scene. (R. 150:264-68.)

Thus,

the only evidence consisted of eyewitness identifications.
To the extent Collins believed blood tests would be
cumulative evidence of guilt given the eyewitness identification
testimony from Winberg and Roque, Collins also would have been
aware that eyewitness identifications are fallible. He knew that
in this case, the crime occurred at 4:00 a.m., Winberg observed
the offense in the dark from across the highway, Winberg's description of what the actor was wearing did not match what Miles
was wearing, and Roque would have observed the actor only briefly
in the dark as he was exiting the building and turning his back
to her.

As an experienced officer, Collins would have realized

that with respect to eyewitness identification, the "human
perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited and
fallible."

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986).

Anyone who stops to consider [eyewitness identification]
will recognize that the process of perceiving events and
remembering them is not as simple or as certain as turning
on a camera and recording everything the camera sees on tape
or film for later replay.
Id.

On the other hand, test results from blood samples would

provide important information to both parties. Given the
fallibility of eyewitness identification, Collins would have
realized the importance of testing the blood samples and the
possibility that the "evidence could form a basis for exonerating
the defendant."

Holden, 964 P.2d at 323.

Instead, Collins destroyed the samples in violation of
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department practices as he understood them.

Thereafter, the

state withheld information about the blood samples during pretrial discovery and prior to Collins' testimony, and Collins
misrepresented the matter under oath on the witness stand.
Collins' conduct supports that he understood "the evidence could
form a basis for exonerating the defendant," when he destroyed
the samples.
The record supports that Collins acted in bad faith. His
destruction of the samples before obtaining test results violated
Miles' due process rights under Youngblood.
C. MILES IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL FOR THE REVERSIBLE
ERROR.
Upon discovering that Collins destroyed the blood samples,
the defense made a motion for a continuance or in the alternative
for a dismissal of the matter.

(R. 151:287-88, 302.)

The trial

court refused the continuance and asked the parties to submit
memoranda of points and authority in support of their respective
positions. (R. 151:313-15.) Since the papers were filed after the
trial, the defense requested a dismissal of the matter. (R. 100110.)
On appeal, this Court may order a new trial with directions
that the prosecution's secondary evidence of blood at the scene
be suppressed, or dismissal of the matter for the Youngblood
violation. In considering appropriate remedies, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Court has stated the following:
"[A]fter concluding that there has been a violation of

23

Youncrblood, the decision to either suppress the government's
secondary evidence describing the destroyed material or to
dismiss the indictment turns on the prejudice that resulted to
the defendant at trial."
Cir. 1994) .

U.S. v. Bohl. 25 F.3d 904, 914 (10th

In that regard, " [such] factors as the centrality of

the evidence at trial the reliability of the secondary evidence,
and the effect such destruction had on the defendant's ability to
present a defense, must be considered in the calculus."

Id.

In this case, the state produced secondary evidence
concerning blood at the crime scene and cuts on Miles' hands
through the following witnesses: Heaston testified that blood was
found throughout the restaurant at various locations (see R.
150:121-29, 131-34); and Collins, Bell, and Morrical testified
that they observed blood inside the restaurant, and small cuts
with dried blood on Miles' hands.

(See e.g. R. 150:234-35, 246-

47, 250-54; 151:292-93, 296, 324-25.)

Miles maintains that the

due process clause would require suppression of the testimony of
those witnesses concerning the matter, as well as suppression of
the related photographs.

See Bohl, 25 F.3d at 914.

Since the state's case also consisted of eyewitness
identification testimony from Winberg and Roque, the analysis
does not end here.
Pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), a
conviction tainted by constitutional error must be set aside
unless the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."

Id.;

see also State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 922 (Utah App. 1995) .
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That analysis requires this Court to decide whether other
credible evidence was before the jury and if it was, whether it
was so compelling that this Court can conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same
verdict without the objectionable evidence.

See State v.

Dahlauist, 931 P.2d 862, 867 (Utah App. 1997).
"It is not enough that we would find sufficient evidence to
support the conviction even if the [offensive evidence] is
excised from the record.

It is inconsequential that a retrial

will most likely result in a conviction.

"Beyond a reasonable

doubt' requires the highest level of certainty known to our legal
system in the resolution of a disputed factual matter."

Id.

If the remaining evidence is clouded with credibility
issues, and/or it concerns problematic identification testimony,
this Court "simply cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the error in admitting the [offensive evidence] was
harmless." Id. at 868.
In this matter, the trial judge recognized the possibility
that the jury may not believe the eyewitness identification
testimony, and that identification testimony required the jury to
resolve credibility issues.

(R. 151:311, 316.)

"The Long

instruction - Long in name as well as length - the Supreme Court
mandates, which I, of course, will be giving in this case, may
well suggest to the jury that they can't put much credibility in
the testimony of an eyewitness."

(R. 151: 316-17.)

The jury instructions in this case directed jurors to
25

consider matters affecting Winberg's and Roque's observations,
such as the lack of light available to the witnesses, the length
of time each witness observed the actor, whether identification
of the actor was a product of each witness' own memory, and the
emotional and physical strains on each witness, including fatigue
and whether the witness was experiencing stress.

(See R. 82-84);

see also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-489 (Utah 1986) .

Those

factors and more affected Winberg's and Roque's testimony in this
case.

(See e.g. R. 150:154, 169 (observations were made at 4:00

a.m.); 150:165-68 (Winberg was preoccupied and stressed);
150:221-24 (Roque's identification testimony was enhanced by the
prosecutor showing a photograph to her before she testified).)
Thus, reliability concerns surrounded the identification
testimony of the eyewitnesses in this case.
Since the jurors were weighing evidence susceptible of
differing interpretations and/or evidence presenting reliability
concerns, see State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-89 (Utah 1986)
(eyewitness identification testimony should be considered with
care given reliability concerns), there was a greater likelihood
that the jurors were influenced by the offensive, secondary
evidence concerning blood. " [T]here is a reasonable possibility
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction." State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 537 (Utah App. 1997)
(quoting Passman v. Blackburn, 797 F.2d 1335, 1349 (5th Cir.
1986) and quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963)).
Thus, use of the offensive evidence was harmful, requiring
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reversal of this matter for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Miles respectfully
requests reversal of the convictions in this matter, and remand
for further proceedings, as this Court may deem appropriate.
SUBMITTED this jp^tt day of

, 1999.

VY\JKJ^UU

LINDA M. JONES
/u
Counsel for Defenda^/t/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused to be
hand delivered an original and

7

copies of the foregoing to

the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and

*/

copies to the Attorney

General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South,
6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, this

3CtL

day of March, 1999.

*sistf/*C7cs^
iftNDA M. JONES

A

DELIVERED to the Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah
Court of Appeals Court as indicated above this
1999.

27

day of March,

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appomtment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THE STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NO. 971922700

Plaintiff,
vs.
HOWARD LLOYD MILES,
Defendant.

Before the Court is the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on
State's Destruction of Evidence. A hearing was held on this matter
on September 18, 1998, at which time counsel for defendant and
counsel

for

the

State presented

their

respective positions.

Following oral argument, the Court took the matter under advisement
to further consider the written submissions.

Since having taken

the defendant's Motion under advisement, the Court has had an
opportunity to once

again review the moving and responding legal

Memoranda, and being otherwise fully advised, enters the following
Memorandum Decision.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 18, 1997, the defendant was charged by Information
with burglary, a third degree felony, and criminal mischief, a
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class B misdemeanor.
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Following a jury trial held August 10 and 11,

1998, the defendant was found guilty on both charges.
At the trial, the State presented circumstantial evidence and
eye-witness testimony that connected the defendant to a burglary
that occurred at an Einstein's Bagel restaurant on December 10,
1997.

During the course of the trial, Officer John Bell testified

that he was called to the scene of the burglary to process it for
fingerprints and to collect blood samples. Officer Bell testified
that he was able to obtain two blood samples; one collected near a
small ledge under the cash register and one collected near the
outside window of the restaurant.

According to Officer Bell's

testimony, he placed the two "swatches" of blood in a container and
turned them over to Officer Scott Collins. Officer Bell testified
that he did not know whether there was a sufficient amount of the
blood samples for the State Crime Lab to perform tests on them, but
that he left the decision of whether to actually take the samples
to the Lab up to Officer Collins.
Officer Collins testified that Officer Bell communicated his
opinion that there was an insufficient amount of blood collected
for any tests to be performed by the State Crime Lab. According to
Officer Collins, the consensus was that the blood samples could not
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be analyzed and that they did not have any evidentiary value.

For

this reason, Officer Collins apparently made the decision not to
prserve the samples.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
In his Motion, the defendant argues that the State violated
his due process right to access to material evidence when the
police officers collected a blood sample from the scene of the
crime and then discarded it.

The State's position is that the

blood samples were not constitutionally material and that even if
they were, the defendant cannot present any evidence that the
police acted in bad faith.
The principle that the government is only required to preserve
evidence in certain circumstances was first definitively addressed
in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984).

In Trombetta, the

defendants had been stopped for suspected drunken driving.

Each

defendant took a breathalyser test and registered higher than .10
percent, an amount which carries a presumption of intoxication.
Although

feasible, the arresting officers failed to preserve

samples of the defendants' breath.
A unanimous Supreme Court declined to find a constitutional
error in the state's failure to take and preserve samples. The
Court held that the standard of fundamental fairness required by
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the Due Process Clause did "not require law enforcement agencies
[to] preserve [evidence] in order to introduce the results of the
tests" conducted on such evidence for three reasons. Id. at 941.
First, the government did not destroy the evidence "in a
calculated

effort

to

circumvent

the

disclosure

requirements

established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny"; rather, the
police officers acted "in good faith and in accord with their
normal practices."
Second,

the

Id. at 488.
evidence

was not

constitutionally material.

According to the Court, materiality meant evidence which possessed
"an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was
destroyed" and was of "such a nature that the defendant would be
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available
means."

JA^ at 489.

On this point, the Court found that other

methods of challenging

the Intoxilyzer test results existed,

including inspecting the machine and its records and introducing
evidence of any outside influences, such as chemicals or radio
waves, that could have affected the test.

Id. at 490.

Finally, the likelihood that the evidence would have been
exculpatory had it been preserved was small.

The Court noted that

the possibility of error in the breath tests was "extremely low"
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and
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that
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samples were more

likely

to be

inculpatory rather than exculpatory.
In Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), defense counsel
sought access to an assault kit and clothing to perform blood-group
tests that might exonerate the defendant of charges of sexual
assault.

Id. at 54.

Such tests proved impossible because the

police had failed to store the samples properly.

Id. at 53.

Youngblood's principle defense was that the victim mistakenly
identified him as the rapist, and that the semen samples, if
properly preserved, would have exonerated him.

Id.

The trial

court proceeded, but instructed the jury that if it found that the
state had destroyed or lost evidence, it should infer that the
evidence would have been favorable to the defendant.

Id. at 54.

The Supreme Court broadened the test articulated in Trombetta,
by holding that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on
the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Id.
at 58.

In so doing, the Court further explained that the mere

possibility that evidence could exculpate a defendant, had it been
preserved, would not be sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
materiality standard articulated in Trombetta.

Instead, the
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exculpatory value of the evidence must be apparent, and this
apparency

must

be

judged before

the

evidence

is

destroyed.

Therefore, "the presence or absence of bad faith by the police for
purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the
police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the
time it was lost or destroyed."

Id. at 56.

The Supreme Court rejected Youngblood's argument that the
mishandling of the samples deprived him of his due process rights,
finding no suggestion of bad faith on the part of the police.

The

Court acknowledged that the likelihood of exoneration was higher
than in Trombetta, but distinguished Trombetta by observing that
the state's case in Youngblood did * not rely upon results from
absent evidence, as was the case in Trombetta.1

The Court found

that the "apparently exculpatory value" standard set forth in
Trombetta was not

satisfied, because no tests had

yet been

performed, and held that failure to preserve "potentially useful
evidence" does not constitute a due process violation unless there
is evidence of bad faith.

Id. at 56.

In reaching this holding,

the Court expressed its unwillingness to speculate about the
possible significance of the destroyed materials and was reluctant
Youngblood was convicted on the basis of a photographic
lineup identification.

STATE V. MILES

PAGE SEVEN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

to "impose . . . an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain
and

to preserve

all material

that might

be

of

conceivable

evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution."

Id. As for

bad faith, the Court stated that "the presence or absence af bad
faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must
necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value
of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed."

Id, at 56-

57.
The Court determines that the present case more closely
resembles Ygungfrlppd then Trombetta.

In Trombetta, the government

failed to save breath samples after they had been tested. -In
Youngblood, similar to the present case, the government failed to
preserve samples so that definitive tests could not be performed.
Also, in Trombetta, a subsequent test by the defendant merely
provided impeachment evidence.

On the other hand, in Youngblood,

as in the present case, a test by the defendant, could it have been
done, offered a possibility of exoneration.

Therefore, the "bad

faith" standard asserted in Youngblood supplies the controlling Due
Process standard.
The

"bad

faith" standard

established

in Youngblood

recently interpreted by the Utah Court of Appeals in State v.

was
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Holden, 348 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In Holden, the
defendant appealed the denial of two motions to suppress, one of
which was based on the contention that the police acted in bad
faith when they destroyed nonincriminating evidence from the search
of the defendant's garbage bags.

The defendant in Holden argued

that the police acted in bad faith by failing to save "potentially
useful" evidence from the trash because "the burden of preservation
was minimal" and because the police acted too quickly in disposing
of the trash without consulting supervisors or written police
procedures.

Id. at 21.

In discussing the requirement of bad faith set forth in
Youngblood, the court emphasized that "[b]ad faith requires that a
defendant must show that

*the police

. . .

by their conduct

indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the
defendant.'" Id, at 20 (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58). The
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion "in
concluding that the police had not acted in bad faith in simply
doing with the rest of his garbage what Holden intended would be
done with it, i.e. disposing of it."

Id. at 21.

In this case, the "exculpatory nature" of the destroyed blood
samples is at best a mere possibility.

Under Youngblood, this is
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not enough to satisfy the constitutional materiality requirement
articulated in Trombetta.

Moreover, there exists no evidence of

bad faith on the part of Officer Collins.

In his Motion, the

defendant seems to argue that a finding of bad faith is justified
on the basis that Officer Collins' testimony is at odds with
Officer Bell's testimony as to whether Officer Collins was informed
that the blood samples were insufficient and could not be tested.
The defendant's emphasis on whether Officer Collins discarded the
blood

samples

misplaced.

because

he

thought

they were

insufficient

is

Under Youngblood, the only relevant inquiry to the

issue of whether Officer Collins acted in bad faith is whether
Officer Collins knew of the exculpatory value of the blood samples
at the time that he made the decision to not preserve the blood
samples for analysis.

The apparent miscommunication between the

officers as to the sufficiency of the blood samples is immaterial
to this inquiry.
The Court finds that Officer Collins did not have knowledge of
the exculpatory value of the blood samples at the time he discarded
them because the blood had not been tested yet. While the failure
of Officer

Collins

to take the blood

samples

to the State

Laboratory for testing can at worst be described as negligent,
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there is no suggestion that Officer Collins discarded the samples
because he knew that they could form the basis for exonerating the
defendant.

In fact, Officer Collins testified that he did not

recognize the blood samples as having any evidentiary value one way
or the other. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion fails to satisfy
the standards of Youngblood.
During oral argument, counsel for the defendant argued that
this case is analogous to State v. Cook, 953 P.2d 712 (Nev. 1998) .
In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed Cook's conviction
because the State lost a number of critical pieces of evidence
including

photographs,

a

report

prepared

by

a

detective

interviewing the defendant, a report of the victim's initial
statement to police and the victim's sweater.

While the court in

Cook did not apply the Youngblood standard, the court essentially
found that the police acted in bad faith by losing items that they
could

have

"reasonably

exculpatory."

anticipated

Id. at 715.

the present case.

to be both material

and

Cook is clearly distinguishable from

Unlike the numerous items lost by the police

officers in Cook, the blood samples that were discarded in this
case did not meet

the constitutional materiality

articulated in Trombetta.

requirement

In addition, the police officers in this
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case did not act in bad faith and could not have reasonably
anticipated whether
exculpatory

since

the blood samples would be material and

the

tests on the blood had not

yet been

performed. Accordingly, the Court determines that the defendant's
reliance on Cook is misplaced.
Based

on

the

defendant's Motion.

foregoing

analysis, the

Court

denies the

Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order

consistent with this Memorandum Decision and syfbmit the same to the
Court for review and signature.
Dated this

.day of September, X998.

r
IMOTHY R. HANSON V^JH
t
ISTRICT COURT VuDGE^/^.?
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foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following,
thise^S
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Rodwicke Ybarra
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Rebecca Hyde
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM C

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
Salt Lake District Attorney
ERNEST W. JONES, Bar No. 1736
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone:(801)363-7900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Case No. 971922700 FS

HOWARD LLOYD MILES,
Judge TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on State's Destruction of Evidence in the above
entitled matter came before this Court for hearing on September 18, 1998. Counsel for Defendant,
Rebecca Hyde, Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, and counsel for the State, Ernest W. Jones,
Deputy District Attorney, presented their respective positions. Following oral argument the matter
was taken under advisement to further consider the written submissions. This Court now enters the
following FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The destroyed blood samples, at best, have only a mere possibility of being exculpatory
in nature.
2. There exists no evidence of bad faith on the part of Officer Collins.
3. There was an apparent miscommunication between the officers as to the sufficiency of
the blood samples.

4. Officer Collins did not have knowledge of the exculpatory value of the blood samples at
the time he discarded them because the blood had not yet been tested.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The blood samples that were discarded in this case did not meet the constitutional
materiality requirement articulated in California v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
2. The government did not destroy the evidence "in a calculated effort to circumvent the
disclosure requirements established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny"; rather, the police
officers acted "in good faith and in accord with their normal practices." Trombetta at 488.
3. The apparent miscommunication between the officers as to the sufficiency of the
blood samples is immaterial to this inquiry.
4. The likelihood that the evidence would have been exculpatory had it been preserved
was small, and therefore the "apparently exculpatory value" standard set forth in Trombetta was
not satisfied.
5. Because the present case deals with a government failure to preserve samples so that
definitive tests could be performed, but does not deal with a failure to preserve samples after they
have been tested, it more closely resembles Arizona v. Youngblood. 488 U.S. 51 (1988), rather
than Trombetta. Therefore, the bad faith standard asserted in Youngblood and recently
interpreted in State v. Holdem 348 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), supplies the
controlling Due Process standard.
6. Because there is no suggestion that Officer Collins discarded the samples because he
knew that they could form the basis for exonerating the defendant, and because he testified that

2

he did not recognize the blood samples as having any evidentiary value at all, the defendant's
Motion fails to satisfy the "bad faith" standards of Youngblood.
7. The defendant's reliance on State v. Cook, 953 P.2d 712 (Nev. 1998) is misplaced
because that case involved numerous items lost by police which they "could reasonably [have]
anticipated to be both material and exculpatory," whereas this case involves blood samples which
do not meet the constitutionality requirement set forth in Trombetta.
8. The destruction of the blood samples did not violate defendants right to Due Process.
9. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is Denied.

DATED this

^

day of October. 1998.

E COURT:

/TIMOTH^y^^Judge

mss

ApproveeHasTErftHaji:.

Rebecca Hyde
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law was hand delivered/mailed postage prepaid on this (J^f\ day of October, 1998
to:
Rebecca C. Hyde
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM D

IMAGED
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 971922700 FS

HOWARD LLOYD MILES,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

PRESENT
Clerk:
matellew
Prosecutor: ERNEST W. JONES
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): REBECCA C HYDE

TIMOTHY R HANSON
September 25, 1998

ENTERS IN H'SrTRY
Or JUDGMENTS
DATE
ttUYfrft

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 21, 1964
Video
Tape Number:

9 : 4 2 am

CHARGES
1. BURGLARY OF A BUILDING - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/1998 Guilty
2. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/1998 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY OF A BUILDING a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 971922700
Date:
Sep 25, 1998

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 3 month(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jai.
Defendant is to pay a fine of $2312.50 where the surcharge has been
added to the fine.
Pay fine to THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC.
Commitment is to begin immediately.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Violate no laws.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as'directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Defendant is to pay restitution to Einstein Bagel's in the amount
of $200. Defendant is to stay away from Einstein Bagels.
Maintain full-time employment or school. Obtain GED or plumbing
education.
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Case No: 971922700
Date:
Sep 25, 1998
Also, all terms and conditions imposed byJudge
971021484 are imposed on this case.
Dated t h i s

^ d a y of

Jjflf-

Stirba in case

/iSpS.

/oKs*-^

JV

IMOTHY R £MTSON - N ^
District <£q$jft Judgev
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